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Abstract We address the concerns about rising inequality
in the German labour market after the implementation of
the Hartz reforms between 2003 and 2005. We focus on
the quality of new jobs started between 1998 and 2010 in
West Germany in terms of job stability and level of earn-
ings. Using social security data drawn from the Integrated
Employment Biographies, we analyse the distributions of
job durations and wages and model their determinants at
the worker level. Our results show a high degree of job
stability during and after the reform years, decreasing wage
levels and increasing wage dispersion.
Keywords Hartz reforms · Job duration · Wage inequality
JEL classification C34 · C41 · J31 · J62 · J68
Die Entwicklung von Beschäftigungsstabilität und
Löhnen seit Einführung der Hartz-Reformen
Zusammenfassung Seit den Hartz-Reformen in den Jah-
ren 2003 bis 2005 gibt es Hinweise auf eine gestiegene
Ungleichheit im deutschen Arbeitsmarkt. Anhand der Indi-
katoren Stabilität und Entlohnung untersuchen wir die Qua-
lität von Beschäftigungsverhältnissen, die im Zeitraum von
1998 bis 2010 begonnen haben. Mit administrativen Daten
aus den Integrierten Erwerbsbiographien analysieren wir
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die Verteilungen und modellieren individuelle Determinan-
ten von Beschäftigungsdauern und Löhnen. Die Ergebnisse
weisen auf ein hohes Maß an Stabilität in den Beschäfti-
gungsdauern, einen Rückgang des Lohnniveaus und einen
Anstieg der Lohnungleichheit während und nach der Peri-
ode der Hartz-Reformen hin.
1 Introduction
The Hartz reforms were implemented from 2003 to 2005
after the so-called “placement scandal” of the Federal Em-
ployment Agency (Fleckenstein 2008). The aims of the
Hartz reforms were to improve public employment services,
enhance the efficiency of active labour market policies and
decrease the number of unemployed persons in Germany.
Among the reforms were the restructuring of the Federal
Employment Agency, a reorganisation of the local employ-
ment agencies, and several minor legislative changes related
to dismissal protection, fixed-term contracts and temporary
agency work (see, e. g., Jacobi and Kluve 2007). The most
important reform, Hartz IV, abolished the then-existing un-
employment assistance for long-term unemployed workers
and consolidated this program with social assistance for
households in need, thereby worsening the conditions for
a vast majority of longer-term unemployment benefit recip-
ients.1
In the years following the reforms, the labour market in
Germany performed surprisingly well: from 2005 to 2008,
unemployment decreased by one-third, while employment
liable to social insurance increased by approximately the
same amount (1.5 million persons, see Fig. 1). During
1 See Goebel and Richter (2007) for an early analysis of changes in
the available income of unemployment benefit recipients.
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Fig. 1 Number of Employed
and Unemployed persons in
Germany (Source: German
Federal Employment Agency,
quarterly average of monthly
data, seasonally adjusted, own
calculations)
0
1.000
2.000
3.000
4.000
5.000
6.000
24.000
25.000
26.000
27.000
28.000
29.000
30.000
Un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t i
n 
1.
00
0
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t i
n 
1.
00
0
Employment (le scale) Unemployment (right scale)
pre-reform post-reform
reform 
period
the recession years of 2008/2009, both the decrease in em-
ployment and the increase in unemployment were modest,
although GDP decreased dramatically (see Fig. 2). This
phenomenon was noticed worldwide, and Krugman even
called it “Germany’s job miracle”. Nevertheless, there are
concerns about rising wage inequality (Card et al. 2013)
and the increasing prevalence of atypical and low-wage jobs
(Eichhorst and Tobsch 2015), tendencies that may have laid
the groundwork for the introduction of a general minimum
wage in Germany in 2015.
This paper takes the positive overall performance of the
German labour market following the Hartz reforms and dur-
ing the great recession as a starting point for our analysis
of whether there is an unsavoury side to this positive trend
in the form of lower job quality. We use job duration and
wages as indicators of job quality and look at new jobs
started between 1998 and 2010 (the terms “job duration”
and “job stability” are used as synonyms throughout the
paper). We are interested in whether changes in job quality
occurred in the “middle” of the labour market and therefore
analyse the stability and wages of regular jobs covered by
social security.
The quality of a specific job has various dimensions and
many of them are difficult to measure. In addition to wages
and stability, aspects such as mental and physical stress,
autonomy and self-responsibility, temporary versus perma-
nent contracts, working time, and the reconciliation of fam-
ily and working life have been the subjects of research.2 The
2 For an overview of several aspects of job quality, see Osterman
(2013) and the literature cited therein.
main reasons for our choice of indicators of job quality
are that job stability and earnings are extremely important
economically and that our data allow us to observe these
indicators very precisely (limitations are discussed later in
the paper).
The expectation that the Hartz reforms have increased in-
equality and created a generation of jobs that are lower paid
and less stable than jobs in the past is supported by search-
theoretical arguments. Intensive monitoring and stricter use
of sanctions will increase the job search intensity of unem-
ployed workers. The worsening of conditions for unem-
ployment benefit recipients will lead to lower reservation
wages and increase the willingness of unemployed work-
ers to accept jobs of a given quality. Rebien and Kettner
(2011) report that after the reforms, job applicants more
often accepted jobs with worse working conditions, e. g.,
longer commutes and even lower wages. In Sweden, Van
den Berg and Vikström (2014) demonstrate that the use of
sanctions induced unemployed job-seekers to take jobs with
lower wages, fewer working hours and fewer qualification
requirements.
The Hartz reforms also contained certain deregulative
elements, such as a reduction of dismissal protection in
small firms and a relaxation of the legislation on temporary
agency work. The growing use of working contracts that
offer less employment protection could be another source
of the rising inequality in the labour market.
There are also good reasons to expect positive effects
of labour market reforms on job quality. The matching of
unemployed workers to jobs may have been positively influ-
enced by the reorganisation of local employment agencies
K
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Fig. 2 Hiring and Separation
Rates over the Business Cycle
(Source: Quarterly hiring rate
[hirings(t)/employment(t-1)] and
separation rate [separations(t)/
employment (t-1)] are calculated
using official data of the German
Federal Employment Agency.
GDP is provided by the Federal
Statistical Office)
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combined with the tightening of active labour market poli-
cies. Even if increased pressure on unemployed job-seekers
will induce them to accept worse jobs in the first round, ac-
cepting these jobs might result in shorter unemployment
durations, less depreciation of human capital, less stigma-
tisation and better signals to firms in the second round.3
Similarly, atypical jobs may become stepping stones into
permanent and better-paid jobs in the medium run.4 All in
all, it is an empirical question whether the Hartz reforms
have had a positive or a negative influence on job quality.
It should be noted that the extent to which the Hartz re-
forms have influenced the German labour market is contro-
versial. In a recent and prominent paper, Dustmann et al.
(2014) argue that the scale of the Hartz reforms was not
sufficiently large to substantially contribute to the positive
changes in competitiveness and unemployment observed af-
ter the reform period. These authors stress the importance
of factors such as flexibility in the German wage-setting
institutions and the growing importance of firm-level nego-
tiation of wages since the restructuring of the German econ-
omy after reunification. However, another view is that the
Hartz reforms and “especially the merger between unem-
ployment assistance and welfare, deeply changed the fun-
3 Nekoei and Weber (2015) and Schmieder et al. (2016) discuss the
effect of extending benefit entitlement periods and highlight the impact
of non-employment duration on wages.
4 Research on previous (pre-Hartz) changes in the employment protec-
tion law yields mixed results on dismissal probabilities and job stability
(Bauer et al. 2007; Boockmann et al. 2008).
damental labor market institutions” (Möller 2015, p. 164).
Similarly, the reduced generosity of the unemployment ben-
efit system as a result of the Hartz reforms is considered
a key determinant of the wage moderation during the years
preceding the great recession (Gartner and Merkl 2011).
Although we share the view that the Hartz reforms had
an important influence on the German labour market, we
do not aim to estimate the size of this impact or to dis-
entangle it from other factors that have contributed to the
positive labour market outcomes observed in recent years.
Our results on job durations and wages are descriptive in
character; nevertheless, we will also perform econometric
model analyses that account for worker and job heterogene-
ity.
We contribute new evidence to previous research in sev-
eral ways. First, whereas existing studies have focussed
primarily on wages, we analyse both wages and job dura-
tion because both aspects are fundamental dimensions of
job quality. Second, a distinctive feature of our analysis
is that we select cohorts of newly started jobs. We ex-
pect the employment contracts of workers taking new jobs
to respond immediately to changes in both legislation and
market conditions. Third, we update the evidence through
2010, giving us a period of analysis that allows us to con-
sider a sufficiently long time span (five years) after the Hartz
reforms.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we review
the literature on job stability and wages in Germany. In
Sect. 3, we describe our empirical strategy, and in Sect. 4,
K
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we present the results. The paper ends with concluding
remarks.
2 The Hartz reforms and recent trends in job
stability and wages in Germany: a review of the
literature
There are several macro-level studies analysing the influ-
ence of the Hartz reforms on aggregate matching efficiency.
Fahr and Sunde (2009) estimate positive effects of the first
two reform packages (which addressed the organisation of
the Federal Employment Agency and local employment
agencies) on both the duration of unemployment and the
matching probability. Subsequent aggregate studies con-
firm the improved matching efficiency following the imple-
mentation of the Hartz reforms (Hertweck and Sigrist 2013)
and the increase in job-finding rates, not only for the short-
term unemployed but also for the long-term unemployed
(Klinger and Rothe 2012). Launov and Wälde (2016) ana-
lyse the impact of different elements of the Hartz reforms
using structural equilibrium models. Comparing pre- and
post-reform steady states, the estimated effect of the reform
of the public employment agencies in Germany accounts for
approximately 20 % of the reduction in equilibrium unem-
ployment, whereas the Hartz IV reform accounts for an-
other 5 %. Taken together, these studies confirm that that
the functioning of the German labour market improved af-
ter the reforms. The reform of the benefit system through
the Hartz IV reform seems to be of minor importance in
the macroeconomic context.
The cyclical behaviour of aggregate labour turnover in
Germany gives a first impression of whether jobs have be-
come more or less stable since the mid-nineties (Rothe
2009). Fig. 2 shows the overall trends in hiring and separa-
tion rates over the business cycle between 1996 and 2012.
Beginning with the year 2001, both rates clearly drop and
continue to decrease during the period of the Hartz reforms.
Remarkably, both hiring and separation rates remain fairly
low during the cyclical upturn following the Hartz reforms
(instead of returning to higher levels) and in the recession
years 2008 and 2009. Thus, there has been a reduction in
worker turnover in Germany that started before the Hartz
reforms and continued thereafter. If job stability had de-
creased significantly after the reform period, we would have
expected to see a corresponding increase in the turnover
rates. This first piece of evidence will be confirmed and
complemented by analyses that account for job heterogene-
ity in our micro-level analysis.
Regarding existing micro-evidence for Germany, there
are studies that should be mentioned even if most of them
do not refer to the Hartz reforms. These studies look at
long-term trends in job stability or wages, and several of
them focus explicitly on inequality and the processes of
sorting or polarization in the labour market.5
Most analyses of long-term trends in individual job du-
ration indicate a constant or declining level of job stability.
Bergemann and Mertens (2011) find a tendency towards
shorter job durations for the period 1984 to 1998, but other
studies present evidence of a rather constant level of job
stability until the middle of the last decade (Giannelli et al.
2012; Rhein 2010). Giesecke and Heisig (2011) look at
the long period from 1984 to 2008 and thus cover the first
years after the Hartz reforms. They find that overall mo-
bility between firms has remained fairly constant, whereas
less qualified workers have experienced a decline in job
stability over time.
Boockmann and Steffes (2010) focus on the determi-
nants of job duration in Germany and demonstrate that in
addition to the socio-economic characteristics of workers,
the internal structure of firms, as captured by the existence
of working councils or further training opportunities, con-
tributes to longer job duration. Furthermore, the results
suggest a sorting process of workers with higher expected
duration to firms offering more stable employment.
The recent literature on wages contains influential contri-
butions that demonstrate a rise in wage dispersion in West
Germany over the last several decades. Dustmann et al.
(2009) focus on wages between 1975 and 2004 and docu-
ment that inequality has continued to rise since the 1980s.
In the 1980s, it was mainly the upper half of the wage
distribution that was affected, but in the early 1990s, in-
equality also started to increase at the bottom half of the
wage distribution. Antonczyk et al. (2010) find particularly
pronounced growth of wage inequality at the bottom of the
wage distribution from 2001 to 2006. Card et al. (2013)
look at full-time workers in the years from 1985 to 2009
in West Germany and demonstrate that increased hetero-
geneity in the establishment component of wages strongly
contributes to the rise in wage inequality. They also find
evidence that (positive) assortative matching has increased,
with workers’ wage potential being more closely correlated
with firms’ wage premia over time. Cornelißen and Hübler
(2011) estimate the influence of unobserved individual and
firm heterogeneity on wage and job-duration functions us-
ing German linked employer-employee data for the years
1996 to 2002. Somewhat at odds with the results of Card
et al. (2013), the estimated individual and firm effects
5 In the international literature, Gottschalk and Moffitt (1999) provide
an overview of early research on job instability in the US during the
1980s and 1990s. Booth et al. (1999) examine job mobility and job
duration over the period 1915 to 1990 in the UK. Autor et al. (2006,
2008) and Goos and Manning (2007) are examples of recent efforts
to study wage inequality and job polarization in the US and the UK.
Goos et al. (2009) provide evidence of disproportionate increases in
both high-paid and low-paid employment in 16 European countries.
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show that high-wage workers tend to be stable workers
and are more likely to be employed in low-wage firms,
whereas low-wage workers are more likely to accept jobs
with shorter durations in high-wage firms.6
The study of Riphahn and Schnitzlein (2016) analyses
individual wage mobility, i. e., the probability of shifting
to a different quantile of the wage distribution or changes
in the rank positions, and shows a substantial decline in
wage mobility over time. The results are provided for East
Germany, where the decline in wage mobility begins in the
early 1990s, and for West Germany, where decreasing wage
mobility has been observed since the late 1990s.
The paper by Arent and Nagl (2013) is relevant because
it claims to estimate the effect of the Hartz reforms on
wages. Their central result, a structural break in the wage
equation in the year of the benefit reforms, differs from
the findings mentioned above and from ours (we find that
wages started to decrease before 2005; see also Ludsteck
and Seth (2014) for a comment).
Our empirical analysis borrows from the literature dis-
cussed in this section, especially when we present evidence
on empirical distributions and in the specification of our
models of job durations and wages. Although the sorting
of workers to firms seems to be a promising road for further
research, the results of these studies are not unambiguous.
Our own analyses are performed at the individual or job
level, which seems to be adequate for our research ques-
tion. Our aim is to assess the changes in job quality after
the implementation of labour market reforms that appar-
ently improved the functioning of the labour market and
led to the creation of new jobs. We use stability and wages
as indicators of job quality and analyse them for a large
share of the labour market.
3 Empirical strategy
We start our analysis with an assessment of overall trends
in the distributions of job durations and wages. We then es-
timate job duration and wage models to determine the size
and direction of changes in job quality across the reform
period while controlling for the heterogeneity of jobs and
workers. Finally, we look at the job quality over time of
three groups of disadvantaged workers, namely, unskilled
workers, previously unemployed workers and temporary
agency workers.
Following a relevant strand of the economic literature,
we measure job quality by the level of wages and by job
6 A possible explanation for this puzzle, at least for large firms, might
be that stable firms tend to be low-wage firms and high-wage workers
can afford to buy job security by choosing permanent and long-lasting
jobs in those stable firms (Cornelißen and Hüber 2011).
duration: the higher the wage is, the better the job is; the
longer a job lasts, the better the job is (Jahn and Rosholm
2014 or Caliendo et al. 2013).
We use a flow sampling approach and select cohorts of
jobs starting in the same year or period. This approach
avoids oversampling of longer durations, known as length-
bias (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). A drawback of this ap-
proach is that our sampling yields a large share of incom-
plete job spells because of the limited observation period.
Because we also censor jobs after 24 months, our analysis
of changes in survival probabilities and job-leaving hazards
over time is confined to changes in the initial two years
in a job and is based on samples with large numbers of
censored job spells.
We examine entry wages (wages at the time of the first
notification of a worker with a specific employer), which
ensures that we do not mix wages for new jobs with the
wages of incumbent workers who have already gained some
experience on the job. Because new jobs will strongly re-
flect current labour market conditions, changes in the mar-
ket wage or an increase in temporary, unstable jobs will
be revealed rather quickly in our samples. With respect to
wages, we see our analyses as complementing other studies
based on stock samples.
3.1 The job duration model
To analyse job durations, we estimate the following piece-
wise exponential mixed proportional hazard model (Bloss-
feld et al. 2007; Cameron and Trivedi 2005; Gutierrez
2002):
ij .t jx0i ˇ; i / D 0.t/exp.x0iˇ/i ;
i D 1; :::; N I j D 1; :::; J
and
0.t/ D j ; j –1 < t < j (1)
where ij is the hazard rate representing the risk of leaving
the current employer during the jthtime interval of the job
spell belonging to individual i. Job durations are split into at
most J time intervals (pieces) to model changes in the risk of
job termination conditional on the time already spent in the
current job. The jth interval starts at duration j 1 and ends
at duration j . The baseline hazard 0.t/ is a step function
that is constant within intervals. Unobserved heterogeneity
is modelled by a gamma-distributed frailty term i that is
assumed to be specific to the job spell. Only the variance
 of the frailty term is estimated.
The vector xi is a set of individual, job, firm, industry,
and macroeconomic time invariant explanatory variables
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that are specific for an individual at the beginning of the
job.
3.2 The wage model
To analyse wages, we estimate censored regression mod-
els that allow us to take the threshold for social security
contributions into account (Cameron and Trivedi 2005).
We model the observed censored wage Wij of individual
i in year j as the realization of a latent variableW ij :
W ij D x0ij ˇ C "i (2)
where xij are the covariates of individual i if her employ-
ment spell starts in year j, and "i is a normally distributed
error term with variance 2.
The observed wage is:
Wij D

W ij
cj
if
Wij < cj
Wij  cj (3)
where cj is the threshold for social insurance contributions,
which varies over time.
The coefficients ˇ measure the influence of the covari-
ates on the latent variable W ij :The maximum likelihood
estimation yields results for the vector of coefficients as
well as for the variance 2.
3.3 Data and variables
We draw our data from a two % sample of the German
Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB), a large admin-
istrative data set regularly produced at the Institute for Em-
ployment Research (IAB) in Nuremberg.7 The IEB contains
employment liable to social insurance but does not include
self-employment or civil servants. We focus on workers’
employment spells and wages from 1998 to 2010.
The analysis will concentrate on West Germany which
accounts for more than 80 % of the German labour market.
A common analysis for East and West is hindered by the
large differences that continue to exist between the two
labour markets.8 Selected results on overall trends in East
Germany are contained in the appendix.
We select workers aged 25 to 54 when starting their jobs.
Workers under 25 or over 54 are excluded because the job
exits of younger workers often coincide with re-entry into
the educational system and the transitions of older workers
might be influenced by the alternative option of retirement.
7 See Jacobebbinghaus and Seth (2007) for a detailed description of an
earlier version of the IEB Sample (IEBS).
8 See Riphahn and Schnitzlein (2016) and Möller (2015) for a discus-
sion of East-West differences in wage distribution.
Because our focus is on employment spells, we also exclude
apprentices of any age.
The duration of a job is defined as a period of em-
ployment in the same establishment.9 Successive sub-spells
within the same establishment are concatenated to generate
the job spells, allowing for a maximum of 90 days of inter-
ruption. The start and end of the job spells are measured
exactly in days. To keep the observation window as long as
possible, we look at durations up to 24 months, therefore
censoring longer job spells. In the case of overlapping job
spells, we only keep the spell with the highest amount of
earnings.
Entry wages are measured as those of the first sub-spell
(lasting at most one year) contained in a possibly longer
employment episode. We deflate the nominal amount with
the German consumer price index to obtain the real daily
wage. Right-censoring occurs at the threshold for social se-
curity contributions, which is adjusted almost every year.10
The exact amount of wages above the threshold is unob-
served.
Even if the data allow us to distinguish between full-
time and part-time work, they do not contain information
on hours worked. Consequently, although we include part-
timers (those liable to social insurance) in the analysis of job
durations, we are forced to exclude them from the analysis
of wages, which implies the neglect of a considerable part of
the female workforce.11 In addition, we exclude “mini-jobs”
and other part-time jobs with short hours or low earnings
from our analyses. Mini-jobs are legally required to fall
below a certain threshold (e. g., 400 C in 2012) and are
largely exempted from social security contributions. The
growth of such jobs in recent years is certainly relevant
to our research question (Jahn et al. 2012; Möller 2014).
However, due to the lack of information on hours worked
and because earnings from mini-jobs often constitute a type
of extra income, these jobs are difficult to analyse without
any information on the household context.
With respect to individual characteristics, the adminis-
trative data contain information on workers’ age, gender
and nationality. Information regarding workers’ skill levels
combines different types of school and university training
9 The employment information is based on firms’ notifications to the
social insurance agencies, which are obligatory at least once annually.
Therefore, the employment period covered by a notification can last
from a few days up to a maximum of one year.
10 In 2010, the West German threshold was equal to 180.82 (5500) C
per day (month).
11 Moreover, there might still be part-time workers in our sample, be-
cause some of them might have been erroneously declared full-time
workers. In fact, since 2011, the collection of information on working
times in the employment statistics has changed. The break in the data
caused by this change has revealed a considerable overestimation of
the share of full-time workers before 2011 (Bundesagentur für Arbeit
2014).
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with a binary indicator of whether the worker has com-
pleted vocational training. We include indicators of labour
market status preceding the new job, distinguishing “jobs
taken after unemployment” (where unemployment is de-
fined by benefit receipt or being registered with the local
employment agency), “job-to-job changes” (allowing for
31 days of non-employment between jobs), “gaps” (peri-
ods without entries in our data) and “first spells”, which
are workers’ first appearance in the IEB. Jobs with fixed-
term contracts contribute to our results on durations and
wages but cannot be distinguished from permanent jobs in
our data. Regarding temporary agency work, the Hartz re-
forms implied a considerable liberalization and the increase
in the number of temporary agency workers has been one
of the main topics in the debate on recent labour market
changes in Germany. In contrast to fixed-term contracts,
temporary agency workers can be identified relatively well
using the industry code (see Antoni and Jahn 2009).
We include industry and firm size class in our models as
information on establishments.12 To take account of busi-
ness cycle effects, we include indicators for the state of the
local labour market: GDP growth obtained from the Ger-
man Federal States’ Accounts and the regional unemploy-
ment rate made available by the Federal Statistical Office,
with both variables measured at the level of the West Ger-
man districts (Kreise). Seasonal effects are modelled by the
inclusion of dummy variables for the quarters of job entry.
In the analysis of overall trends in job quality, we focus
on yearly cohorts of new jobs. In our regression models
of job duration and wages, we group the observations into
three sub-periods: jobs beginning in the period before the
reforms (1998 to 2002), jobs beginning during the period
of the Hartz reforms (2003 to 2005) and jobs beginning in
the post-reform period (2006 to 2009/2010).
4 Results
We first discuss the results of the overall analysis of job
duration and wages in new jobs (Sect. 4.1). We then turn
to the model analysis (Sect. 4.2) and, finally, to the re-
sults concerning the three selected groups of disadvantaged
workers: unskilled workers, temporary agency workers, and
previously unemployed workers (Sect. 4.3).
12 Because of several changes in the classification system of industries,
a combined 3-digit industry variable generated at IAB’s Research Data
Centre (see Eberle et al. 2011) is used and regrouped into broader
categories for the regression analyses.
4.1 Trends in the distributions of job durations and
wages
The duration of a new job is defined as an uninterrupted
period of work with the same employer (see Sect. 3.3).
We adopt Kaplan-Meier survival function estimators to plot
time trends of the distributions of job durations. For wages,
we compare the quartiles (25th, median and 75th percentile)
of the distribution of log wages. To visualize broad group
differences, we first distinguish by gender and then by skill
level.
4.1.1 Durations of newly started jobs
Fig. 3 shows the estimated probabilities of staying in a job
at specific durations after the job begins for job spells
started between January 1998 and December 2009 (Decem-
ber 2008 for survival probabilities of 18 and 24 months).
Job stability is fairly high. The estimated 12-month sur-
vival probabilities for male workers are between 50 and
60 %, and they are even higher for female workers (see
also Table 4 in the appendix). Over time, the survival prob-
abilities for male workers seem to be fairly stable, whereas
for female workers they show a tendency towards longer job
durations. There is a temporary decrease in survival prob-
abilities for jobs beginning in the year 2000; this decrease
is more pronounced for women and for longer durations.
We do not have a ready explanation for this result;13 in any
case, the size of this reduction is rather limited (up to 4 per-
centage points for women’s 24-month survival probability,
see Table 4 in the appendix).14 Overall, the vertical dis-
tances between the survival probabilities at different dura-
tions remain fairly constant, meaning that within the groups
of male and female workers, job durations do not become
much more unevenly distributed over time (see also Fig. 7
in Sect. 4.3). As an intermediate result, there are no signs
of a general downward trend in job durations during or after
the reform period, which confirms the aggregated turnover
rates presented in Fig. 2.15.
Fig. 4 distinguishes between three skill levels (see also
Table 5 in the appendix). The category of “unskilled”
workers comprises those with lower than medium education
13 If anything, the labour market reforms adopted in the period
1999–2001 went in the direction of re-regulation (see Giannelli et al.
2012).
14 The decrease in the 2009 survival probabilities for longer durations
is due to the censoring of these spells at the end of 2010.
15 In East Germany, the 6-month survival probabilities decrease some-
what over time, whereas longer-term survival probabilities remain con-
stant or even increase. As a result, survival probabilities for jobs started
in 2008/2009 in East Germany are more similar to those observed in
West Germany than they were previously. See Fig. 8 and Table 4 in the
appendix.
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Fig. 3 Job Survival Prob-
abilities after 6, 12, 18 and
24 Months. Survival probabil-
ities at 18 and 24 months are
not observed for jobs starting
in 2009 (Source: IEB, own
calculations, N = 816,774)
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and without vocational training. The category of “skilled”
workers includes workers with up to a medium level of
education, workers with vocational training, and workers
with a degree that qualifies them for professional college
or university attendance. Workers in the “highly skilled”
category have college or university degrees.
For a given duration, highly skilled workers have the
highest survival probabilities, whereas unskilled workers
have the lowest. Over time, the survival probabilities de-
crease somewhat for unskilled workers, especially at job
durations of 18 and 24 months. The opposite is true for
highly skilled workers; their survival probabilities show
a slight upward trend, which is stronger for longer job du-
rations. Because the observed changes are rather small,
this evidence indicates that heterogeneity in job durations
within skill groups has also not increased significantly over
time.
4.1.2 Wages in newly started jobs
This analysis is confined to full-time workers, because in-
formation on hours worked is not available for part-time
workers (see Sect. 3.3).
By now, the growth in earnings inequality over the last
several decades and a steady decline in real wages since the
early 2000 s is fairly well established for Germany, as well
as for other industrialized countries (Dustmann et al. 2009,
Card et al. 2013). With its focus on new jobs, our analysis
presents further evidence on this issue.
The wage variable is measured as the log of daily real
wages in 2005 prices. In Fig. 5, the 25th percentile, median,
and 75th percentile of the wage distributions for men and
women are plotted over the years (exact figures for the years
1998 and 2010 can be found in Table 6 in the appendix).
In line with the results of Card et al. (2013), the decrease
in real wages after 2001 is clearly visible. For both men and
women in new jobs, the decline in wages is strongest in the
25th and 50th percentiles of the wage distribution, whereas
the decline in the 75th percentiles is comparatively modest.
Furthermore, wage inequality has been increasing among
both men and women. The lower interquartile difference
(50th percentile minus 25th percentile) has increased by 8 %
for men and by 4 % for women, and the upper interquar-
tile difference (75th percentile minus 50th percentile) has
increased by 6 % for both men and women (Table 6).16
As previously noted, “wage moderation” is one poten-
tial explanation of Germany’s relatively good employment
performance during the great recession in 2008/2009. In
accordance with most of the studies summarized in Sect. 2,
our results show that the decrease in real wages begins well
before the Hartz reforms. Thus, one impact of the reforms
might have been to strengthen a pre-existing tendency to-
wards lower wages. The size of wage losses in our sample
16 For values up to 0.05, the differences in log points are good approx-
imations of percentage wage changes.
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Fig. 4 Job Survival Prob-
abilities after 6, 12, 18 and
24 Months, by Skill Level. Sur-
vival probabilities of 18 and
24 months are not observed for
jobs starting in 2009. (Source:
IEB, own calculations; N =
816,774)
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of new jobs is clearly larger than the wage decreases re-
ported in Card et al. (2013).17
The differences in entry wages between skill levels are
substantial (Fig. 6, Table 7 in the appendix). Furthermore,
the disadvantage of unskilled workers is increasing. The
median log wage of highly skilled workers, for example,
decreased from 4.79 in 1998 to 4.63 in 2010, implying
a daily wage loss of 15 % (approximately 18 C). The cor-
responding median wage loss for skilled workers from 1998
to 2010 was also 15 % (10 C). However, the median wage
loss for unskilled workers was 21 % (11 C; see Table 7).
In addition, within-group inequality has been rising, which
also accords with the results of Card et al. (2013). For
the skilled and highly skilled worker groups, the decline in
17 The 1995–2009 wage decreases shown in Table 1 in Card et al.
(2013) amount to –4 to –6 %. Considering workers moving between
different quartiles of the establishment wage distribution, the study also
finds large wage decreases in certain cases, especially for the period
2002–2009 (see Card et al. 2013; Online Appendix Table 6).
18 For highly skilled workers, the 75th percentile is unfortunately not
informative because for this group, between 17 %(in 2010) and 29 %(in
1998) of workers have entry wages above the social security threshold.
19 Overall wage trends for East Germany are contained in the ap-
pendix, Fig. 9 and Table 6. In 2010, there remains a substantial gap
between the levels of East German and West German wages. Wage
dispersion in East Germany has increased over time and is larger for
women than for men. The wage decrease in East Germany was largest
in the lowest quartile and larger for men than for women in all three
quartiles. In 2010, East German daily full-time wages at the 25th
percentile were approximately 38 C for men and approximately 33 C
for women.
wages is strongest in the 25th percentile (that is, for workers
with the lowest earnings in these groups).18 19
4.2 Model analysis
4.2.1 Job duration
Although no general tendency towards shorter job durations
over time was revealed by the analysis in Sect. 4.1.1, we
now consider the possibility that changes in the composition
of jobs have influenced this result. We estimate a duration
model that controls for a broad range of explanatory vari-
ables. The objective is to determine whether the period in
which the Hartz reforms were implemented or the subse-
quent period are associated with changes in job durations
when we take into account changes in the structure of jobs,
as captured by our covariates. Because we do not use an
experimental or quasi-experimental design, the estimated
covariate effects reflect empirical associations rather than
causal influences.
The model is a single spell model, estimated separately
for men and women, for employment spells beginning be-
tween January 1998 and December 2008. For persons with
20 The selection of only one spell per person and the exclusion of spells
starting in 2009 account for the different numbers of observations used
for the graphical survival analysis in Section 4.1.1 and the model anal-
ysis in this section. The means of the model variables are contained in
Table 8 in the appendix.
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Fig. 5 Distribution of Wages
(Source: IEB, own calculations,
N = 747,214)
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Fig. 6 Distribution of Wages
by Skill Level (Source: IEB,
own calculations, N = 747,214)
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more than one new job in the observation window, we ran-
domly select only one spell.20
The results are presented in the form of hazard ratios,
which – in the case of binary or categorical variables –
indicate the influence of a variable on the risk of leaving
the job relative to the reference group (see Table 1). The
relationship between the risk of terminating a job and job
duration is inverse, meaning that a value of the hazard ra-
tio greater (smaller) than one implies a positive (negative)
effect on the hazard and a negative (positive) effect on du-
ration for that variable. The z-values in Table 1 are based
on the cluster-robust estimation of the variance-covariance
matrix, because the district-level variables of unemploy-
ment rate and GDP growth give rise to a within-district
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correlation of regression model errors (Cameron and Miller
2015).21
Starting with our variables of interest, the time period
indicators of the year of entry are smaller than one for both
men and women during the reform period (2003–2005).
For the post-reform period (2006–2008), the hazard ratio
continues to be smaller than one for women but is insignifi-
cant for men. These results imply that job durations ceteris
paribus are somewhat longer for new jobs started in the re-
form period (2003–2005) compared to the reference period
(1998–2002). For men, in the years following the Hartz
reforms, durations do not differ from those in the reference
period, whereas for women, job durations continue to be
slightly longer than those in the period preceding the Hartz
reforms.
For the rest of the models, the pattern of the baseline
hazard, the associations of the covariates with the hazard
rate and the relevance of the frailty term are of interest as
well. The pattern of the estimated risk of leaving a job is
non-monotonic: the hazard ratios for the time periods at the
top of the table initially slightly increase (for women, there
is also a temporary decline in the third month) and then
start to decrease after the first three months of employment.
This non-monotonic pattern can be explained by the high
initial risk of contract dissolution if a mismatch is found
in combination with the stabilizing effect of job-specific
human capital (Blossfeld et al. 2007, p. 121). In addition
to this baseline pattern – and despite the large number of
covariates – the importance of unobserved heterogeneity is
confirmed in all of our models by likelihood ratio tests that
are highly significant.
The results also point to a clear seasonal pattern in job
durations. The estimated hazard ratios from the men’s
model are large and increase during the year, implying the
longest durations for jobs beginning in the first three cal-
endar months. For women, this pattern is less regular and
less pronounced.
The state of the local labour market might influence job
durations through fluctuations in labour demand. The re-
spective control variables are insignificant, however. Per-
sistent differences in economic conditions between regions
might also influence job durations. The estimated hazard
ratios for the federal states seem to reflect to some extent
the north-south divide in Germany. The reference is North
Rhine-Westphalia, which is the state with the largest pop-
ulation and is situated in the western centre. Significantly
shorter job durations are estimated in the northern states
21 As suggested by an anonymous referee, we tested an alternative
model specification that includes district-level dummy variables in-
stead of the continuous variables used in the model in Table 1. The
differences between the results of these two specifications with respect
to other covariates were very small. The results of the district dummy
variable models are available upon request.
of Schleswig Holstein and Hamburg, and longer job dura-
tions are estimated in the southern states. For the state of
Hesse, situated in the southern centre, and the economi-
cally strong states Baden Württemberg and Bavaria, which
are both situated in the south of Germany, we find lower
risks of leaving jobs and thus longer durations (in Bavaria,
this is only found for women).
The effect of firm size is clear and rather large. As pre-
dicted by theories of internal labour markets, job duration
monotonically increases with the size of the firm for both
men and women.
For some industries, we can also note fairly strong and
significant effects. Compared to business services (the ref-
erence group), jobs tend to be very stable for men in man-
ufacturing and for women in social and public services.
Very large and significant hazard ratios for both men and
women are estimated for temporary agency jobs, indicating
far shorter durations. Although this confirms the general no-
tion that temporary agency jobs are of low quality, a more
careful analysis would need to look at subsequent jobs to
see how many temporary agency jobs lead to regular jobs
(e. g., Jahn and Rosholm 2014).
Part-time jobs with a minimum of 18 h per week are
much shorter for men but only slightly more stable for
women. One interpretation of this finding is that for many
men, part-time jobs are only temporary solutions until they
find a full-time job. Women might have longer durations
in part-time jobs, although these jobs are relatively hard to
find.
Age and nationality have the expected effects: job dura-
tion is much shorter for younger age groups and foreigners.
The skill effect is pronounced for both men and women.
Workers for whom information on skill was missing and
unskilled workers have far higher risks of leaving their
jobs compared to the reference group (vocational training
with at least an intermediate degree), which indicates the
importance of completed vocational training in Germany.
Among workers with higher educational levels, only men
with a university or comparable degree have more stable
jobs than the reference group. Among the categories de-
scribing previous labour market status, the reference group
(job-to-job changers)22 is the largest group. Persons begin-
ning new jobs out of unemployment form another sizeable
group. Although the group of persons starting a new job
after a gap is also fairly large, the group of persons in their
first jobs and the group of persons who are first unemployed
and then have a gap before starting their current jobs are
both rather small. The results show clearly that compared
to job-to-job changers, all other groups experience shorter
job durations. The negative association with duration is
22 Job-to-job changers are defined as workers with at most one month
of non-employment between their last job and their current job.
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Table 1 Job Duration Models for West Germany
Job duration
Men Women
Hazard ratio za Hazard ratio za
Durationb
0–31 days 0.802 –171.5 0.936 –197.6
32–61 days 0.923 –190.9 0.988 –195.5
62–91 days 0.905 –198.2 0.893 –194.9
92–122 days 1.039 –192.8 1.036 –205.7
123–183 days 0.906 –186.5 0.878 –223.8
184–365 days 0.877 –190.9 0.793 –232.9
366–548 days 0.733 –173.2 0.676 –229.0
549–730 days 0.728 –162.5 0.652 –203.9
Year of entry (ref: 1998–2002)
2003–2005 0.897 –9.2 0.916 –7.2
2006–2008 0.984 –1.2 0.959 –3.6
Quarter of entry (ref: 1st quarter)
2nd quarter 1.320 21.0 1.212 14.4
3rd quarter 1.333 21.2 1.184 12.3
4th quarter 1.364 21.3 1.238 15.8
Local labour demand (district level)
Unemployment rate 1.002 0.8 1.000 –0.1
GDP growth 0.999 –0.7 0.998 –1.7
Federal state (ref: North Rhine-Westphalia)
Schleswig Holstein, Hamburg 1.060 2.5 1.032 1.2
Lower Saxony, Bremen 1.033 1.4 0.989 –0.6
Hesse 0.963 –2.0 0.945 –3.1
Rhineland Palatinate, Saarland 1.050 2.1 0.961 –1.3
Baden-Württemberg 0.930 –3.2 0.904 –4.8
Bavaria 1.000 0.0 0.932 –3.4
Firm size (ref: <20 employees)
20–49 0.813 –14.5 0.966 –2.3
50–249 0.680 –28.8 0.914 –6.6
250–999 0.538 –31.9 0.779 –13.3
1000 and more 0.460 –19.4 0.659 –13.8
Industry (ref: business services)
Agriculture, mining 2.089 14.6 2.337 9.3
Energy, traffic and information 1.098 3.0 1.017 0.7
Manufacturing 0.751 –11.7 0.918 –4.5
Construction 1.175 6.0 0.849 –4.2
Trade and retail 0.895 –4.4 1.011 0.6
Personal and domestic services 1.389 9.4 1.374 14.9
Social and public services 0.980 –0.9 0.828 –10.5
Temporary work agency 4.302 38.9 4.251 40.5
Foreigner 1.682 32.8 1.438 18.5
Age (ref: 30–34)
Age 25–29 1.121 8.2 1.208 12.4
Age 35–39 0.955 –3.4 0.856 –11.1
Age 40–44 0.911 –6.0 0.820 –11.6
K
The evolution of job stability and wages after the implementation of the Hartz reforms 281
Table 1 Job Duration Models for West Germany (Continued)
Job duration
Men Women
Hazard ratio za Hazard ratio za
Age 45–49 0.895 –6.1 0.824 –10.6
Age 50–54 0.908 –5.8 0.828 –10.2
Skill Level (ref: vocational training with at most an intermediate degree)
Missing information on educational level 1.875 18.6 1.696 17.1
No vocational training with at most an interme-
diate degree
1.254 12.7 1.294 14.9
High school/equivalent; with or without voca-
tional training
1.076 4.3 1.002 0.1
University/technical/professional college de-
gree
0.823 –11.2 1.036 2.5
Preceding state (ref: job-to-job)
First spell 1.035 1.9 1.085 4.9
Unemployed 1.995 45.1 1.748 33.6
Job followed by gap 1.708 31.6 1.503 28.7
Unemployment followed by gap 1.205 10.9 1.217 12.6
Part-time (min. 18 h/week) 1.407 11.9 0.954 –3.2
Variance of frailty term (log θ) –0.394 –8.5 –0.852 –8.8
LR – test for significance of θ 1100.9 – 223.6 –
Wald chi2 1,558,412 – 1,255,807 –
Log likelihood –218,031 – –173,214 –
Number of obs. 180,546 – 142,335 –
aThe standard errors are adjusted for 325 regional clusters using a separate model with a non-individual-specific frailty term
bThe hazard ratios of the duration time pieces are multiplied by 1000 in order to obtain legible values
Source: IEB, Federal Statistical Office, own calculations
strongest for persons who are unemployed immediately be-
fore starting a job.
4.2.2 Wages
As in the duration model, we use one randomly selected
employment spell per person beginning in the period 1998
to 2009. We estimate the models separately for men and
women in West Germany (see Table 2).23
Once again, the coefficients24 of the time period indica-
tors are of central interest. They are negative for the reform
period (2003–2005) and for the period following the Hartz
reforms (2006–2009), indicating that real wages have been
falling since the reference period. Although we control
for cyclical effects by including GDP growth rates, an ad-
23 Once again, the difference between the number of observations used
to produce Fig. 5 and 6 and the number of observations used in the
wage model follows from the selection of only one spell per person and
from the exclusion of spells starting in the final year, 2010. Descriptive
information on the variables of the wage model is contained in Table 9
in the appendix.
24 As a rule of thumb, small coefficients (<0.05) indicate percentage
wage changes associated with a unit change in the respective covariate.
For larger coefficients, this rule becomes inaccurate.
ditional wage effect of the great recession in 2008/2009
cannot be excluded. The negative wage effect during the
reform period is slightly stronger for women than for men;
in the post-reform period, we observe much lower entry
wages for both sexes. The skill level has the expected
positive effect on wages.
Potential work experience has a significant effect only
for men. The wages of foreigners are approximately 8 %
lower for women and more than 10 % lower for men.
The preceding labour market status is highly relevant
for wages in newly started jobs. There is a large negative
wage differential for workers in their first job following un-
employment. The estimated coefficients are –0.268 (men)
and –0.228 (women), which correspond to percentage wage
losses of 20 % or more compared to the reference wages of
job-to-job changers.
Given the size of these coefficients, it should be stressed
once again that these results are descriptive and do not
reflect causal relationships.25
25 Schmieder et al. (2016) estimate a causal effect of unemployment
on wages. The effect is found to be significantly negative and large,
with an additional month of unemployment corresponding to a reduc-
tion in the reemployment wage of 0.8 %.
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Table 2 Wage Models for West Germany
Censored Regression Model
Log Real Wages
Men Women
Coefficient za Coefficient za
Year of entry (ref: 1998–2002)
2003–2005 –0.023 –5.7 –0.030 –5.5
2006–2009 –0.089 –29.8 –0.088 –20.1
Skill level (ref: vocational training with at most an intermediate degree)
Missing information on educational level –0.205 –11.1 –0.174 –11.3
No vocational training with at most an intermediate
degree
–0.220 –38.4 –0.217 –23.3
High school/equivalent; with or without vocational
training
0.096 17.7 0.148 22.0
University/technical/professional college degree 0.495 52.6 0.413 44.2
Potential experienceb 3.582 27.1 0.044 0.3
Potential experience squaredb –0.063 –23.2 0.006 1.8
Preceding state (ref: job-to-job)
First spell 0.024 5.7 –0.014 –2.4
Unemployed –0.268 –48.4 –0.228 –37.6
Job followed by gap –0.179 –34.4 –0.190 –31.9
Unemployment followed by gap –0.179 –29.9 –0.198 –28.3
Local labour demand (district level)
Unemployment rate –0.002 –2.1 0.003 2.2
GDP growth 0.035 0.8 0.067 0.8
Federal state (ref: North Rhine-Westphalia)
Schleswig Holstein, Hamburg –0.023 –1.4 0.021 0.7
Lower Saxony, Bremen –0.048 –6.7 –0.063 –3.2
Hesse 0.011 0.6 0.045 1.6
Rhineland Palatinate, Saarland –0.049 –4.4 –0.048 –2.8
Baden-Württemberg 0.017 1.6 0.017 1.0
Bavaria 0.008 0.5 0.038 1.1
Firm size (ref: < 20 employees)
20–49 0.128 34.1 0.176 31.3
50–249 0.181 37.1 0.268 49.2
250–999 0.270 45.8 0.395 50.1
1000 and more 0.363 37.2 0.511 31.4
Industry (ref: business services)
Agriculture, mining –0.221 –13.1 –0.174 –7.8
Energy, traffic and information –0.123 –8.8 –0.010 –0.4
Manufacturing 0.007 0.8 –0.035 –2.8
Construction 0.005 0.5 –0.173 –8.0
Trade and retail –0.035 –4.3 –0.051 –3.7
Personal and domestic services –0.359 –32.0 –0.247 –21.3
Social and public services –0.164 –13.3 –0.006 –0.3
Temporary work agency –0.543 –43.2 –0.405 –31.5
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Table 2 Wage Models for West Germany (Continued)
Censored Regression Model
Log Real Wages
Men Women
Coefficient za Coefficient za
Foreigner –0.153 –29.4 –0.080 –9.4
Constant 4.017 270.0 3.941 209.9
Log (sigma) –0.863 –65.6 –0.699 0.7
Wald chi2 (33) 39.685 – 38.019 –
Log pseudolikelihood –105.077 – –72.515 –
Number of obs. 178,065 – 99,012 –
Censored obs. 17,278 – 2827 –
aThe standard errors of the coefficients are adjusted for 325 regional clusters
bThe coefficients of the experience variables and of GDP growth are multiplied by 100 in order to obtain legible values
Source: IEB, Federal Statistical Office, own calculations
The coefficient of the local unemployment rate is nega-
tive in the model for men’s wages and positive in the model
for women’s wages.26 The effects of the federal states vari-
ables are often insignificant, with persons from Lower Sax-
ony/Bremen and Rhineland Palatinate/Saarland having sig-
nificantly lower wages than those from the reference state
of North Rhine-Westphalia.
Firm size is positively correlated with wages; larger firms
pay higher wages. This effect seems to be stronger for
women. In most industries, wages are lower than in busi-
ness services, which is the reference group. In particular,
workers in personal and domestic services and temporary
agency workers are worse off.
4.2.3 Summary of results for job duration and wages
In summary, the results of the multivariate analysis pre-
sented in this section show that ceteris paribus, the dura-
tions of new jobs did not significantly decrease either during
or after the Hartz reform period compared to the previous
period (1998–2002) and that there were real wage losses
during the reform period and even greater wage losses in
the period following the Hartz reforms.
4.3 Job durations and wages for selected groups of
workers over time
Because our analysis is concerned with increasing inequal-
ity, it might be worthwhile to check whether the situations
of certain groups of workers known to be disadvantaged
have improved or worsened over time. We select three
26 The positive sign in the model for women is somewhat surprising,
but because we do not estimate a causal model, this result may simply
be a spurious relationship resulting from changes in the supply of fe-
male labour and associated positive wage changes during our observa-
tion period. An anonymous referee brought this issue to our attention.
groups – temporary agency workers, workers who were
unemployed before starting a new job, and unskilled work-
ers – to determine whether trends for them differ from the
overall trends assessed previously.
In Fig. 7, similar to Sect. 4.1, Kaplan-Meier survivor
functions are plotted across periods for the entire sample
(first panel) and for the groups of temporary agency work-
ers, unskilled workers, and previously unemployed workers.
It is obvious that there is virtually no effect on job du-
rations for these groups over time. Comparing the survivor
functions of these three groups with that of the entire sam-
ple confirms the lower level of job stability for the selected
groups, especially for temporary agency workers.27
Table 3 presents median log wages together with changes
across time periods for the entire sample and for the
three selected groups of workers. The model analysis in
Sect. 4.2.2 clearly proved that these groups have lower
wages ceteris paribus, and the median wages complement
this finding. For all men, the median wage dropped by 3 %
from the first to the second period and further declined by
approximately 9 % from the second to the third period. For
women, the decline between the first two periods is also
approximately 3 % and the decline between the second and
the third periods is approximately 4 %.
Temporary agency workers, the group with the lowest
median wage, experienced sizable wage losses between the
first two periods: the median wage dropped by approx-
imately 6 % for men and more than 10 % for females.
Unskilled workers as a group clearly suffered the largest
wage losses: for men, the median wage falls by approxi-
mately 8 % between the first two periods and falls again
by more than 10 % between the second and third periods.
The median wage of female unskilled workers falls by ap-
27 We also tried to assess the question of different group trends by
estimating models in which all covariates were interacted with the time
period indicators. These results are available upon request.
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Table 3 Median Wages for Different Groups (Source: IEB, own calculations)
Log Median Wage Differences
1998–2002 2003–2005 2006–2010 03/05–98/02 06/10–03/05
Men All 4.36 4.33 4.24 –0.03 –0.09
Temporary 3.81 3.75 3.71 –0.06 –0.04
Unskilled 4.03 3.95 3.84 –0.08 –0.12
Unempl. before 4.19 4.16 4.05 –0.03 –0.12
Women All 4.14 4.11 4.06 –0.03 –0.04
Temporary 3.75 3.64 3.63 –0.11 –0.01
Unskilled 3.83 3.77 3.69 –0.06 –0.08
Unempl. before 3.99 3.93 3.87 –0.06 –0.06
N = 761,246
proximately 6 % between the first and second periods and
by approximately 8 % between the second and the third
periods. For men who were unemployed before starting
the current job, there is also a very sharp decline in the
median wage between the last two periods. For the group
of women starting a job after unemployment, the drop in
the median wage is approximately 6 % both between the
first two periods and between the last two periods.
It is reasonable to consider overlaps between these
groups of disadvantaged workers (e. g., workers who are
both unskilled and employed in a temporary work agency)
and to examine the median wages of these overlap groups
across periods. However, jobs with workers belonging
to two or more of our disadvantaged groups account for
less than 10 % of the sample, and there are only a few
subgroups for which the wage trends were even worse than
those reported in Table 3.28
In summary, median wage losses were often larger in
the three selected groups compared to overall wage trends.29
The sizable wage losses observed for jobs held by disadvan-
taged groups of workers might partly reflect demand-side
changes, such as changes in relative skill demand. On the
supply side, the decrease in reservation wages of workers
in these groups is likely linked to the changes in the benefit
system, because the risk of (recurrent) unemployment for
these workers is comparatively high.
28 In contrast, the jobs of previously unemployed workers account for
29 % of the job sample used for the descriptive analysis in Table 3 and
jobs in temporary agencies – which strongly increased in number after
the reform period – account for 10 % of that job sample.
29 When we tried to detect these combined group-period-effects by in-
cluding interaction terms in our wage model, the coefficients were of-
ten rather small and insignificant. The results are available from the
authors upon request.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have assessed whether a reduction in the
quality of new jobs has occurred in the German labour
market during and/or after the implementation of the Hartz
reform.
Our results on overall trends in job durations indicate
stable job durations for men and somewhat longer dura-
tions for women. Interestingly, the graphical analysis does
not show a stronger tendency towards a more unequal dis-
tribution of job durations. Consistent with the finding of
decreased labour turnover, the results of the duration analy-
sis even imply somewhat longer job durations in the reform
period. When looking at selected groups of workers, we
also do not find evidence of decreased job stability over
time. Although job stability seems to hold steady, we con-
firm both a decrease in real wages over time and an in-
crease in overall wage dispersion. For our sample of newly
started jobs, several of the observed wage decreases are
quite large. The estimated models reveal stronger wage
losses in the period 2006–2009 compared to the reform pe-
riod 2003–2005, which is due at least in part to the great
recession in 2008/2009. The selected groups experienced
severe wage losses in both periods, which in most cases
were larger than the sizeable decrease in the overall median
wage.
The predominantly high level of job stability is rather
surprising. One explanation could be that the matching
process has become more efficient, not only with respect
to the duration of job searches but also with respect to
the quality of job matches. In light of the results regard-
ing wages, however, we attribute this stability to the higher
cost of job mobility. Workers are more reluctant to quit both
because the benefit system is less generous than it was pre-
viously and because entry wages are decreasing over time.
Nevertheless, firms can count on very flexible labour, as
demonstrated by the far shorter job durations of temporary
agency workers compared to other workers.
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Fig. 7 Survivor Functions
for Different Groups. a Men,
b Women (Source: IEB, own
calculations, N = 832,158)
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With respect to wages, it is difficult to attribute our re-
sults solely to the Hartz reforms. The decrease in real
wages for our sample of new jobs begins in the years
2001/2002, well before the Hartz reforms. However, the
marked wage losses for disadvantaged groups of workers
indicate a strong decline in reservation wages, which is
likely linked to changes in the benefit system because these
workers suffer a comparatively high risk of unemployment,
especially long-term unemployment.
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Appendix
Fig. 8 East Germany: Job
Survival Probabilities after 6,
12, 18 and 24 Months (Source:
IEB, own calculations; N =
248,240)
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Table 4 Survival Probabilities after 6, 12, 18 and 24 Months of Duration, by Gender
West Germany
– Men Women
Year 6 Mths 12 Mths 18 Mths 24 Mths 6 Mths 12 Mths 18 Mths 24 Mths
1998 0.72 0.56 0.49 0.42 0.75 0.60 0.51 0.44
1999 0.71 0.56 0.47 0.41 0.76 0.62 0.52 0.46
2000 0.70 0.55 0.46 0.39 0.73 0.59 0.49 0.42
2001 0.71 0.55 0.47 0.39 0.75 0.59 0.51 0.44
2002 0.70 0.54 0.46 0.40 0.74 0.59 0.51 0.45
2003 0.71 0.56 0.47 0.41 0.76 0.62 0.53 0.46
2004 0.71 0.55 0.47 0.41 0.75 0.62 0.53 0.46
2005 0.71 0.55 0.48 0.42 0.76 0.62 0.54 0.47
2006 0.70 0.55 0.47 0.40 0.75 0.62 0.53 0.46
2007 0.70 0.57 0.47 0.41 0.75 0.62 0.53 0.46
2008 0.70 0.55 0.47 0.41 0.76 0.62 0.53 0.46
2009 0.70 0.54 – – 0.76 0.61 – –
East Germany
– Men Women
Year 6 Mths 12 Mths 18 Mths 24 Mths 6 Mths 12 Mths 18 Mths 24 Mths
1998 0.71 0.48 0.39 0.33 0.80 0.53 0.44 0.38
1999 0.68 0.50 0.36 0.29 0.78 0.62 0.45 0.39
2000 0.68 0.47 0.37 0.31 0.77 0.53 0.43 0.37
2001 0.69 0.46 0.38 0.30 0.78 0.56 0.49 0.41
2002 0.68 0.47 0.39 0.33 0.77 0.56 0.49 0.43
2003 0.66 0.48 0.38 0.32 0.75 0.59 0.49 0.44
2004 0.64 0.44 0.37 0.31 0.73 0.56 0.48 0.42
2005 0.66 0.47 0.40 0.34 0.75 0.59 0.52 0.45
2006 0.68 0.51 0.43 0.37 0.75 0.59 0.52 0.46
2007 0.69 0.53 0.43 0.37 0.76 0.61 0.51 0.45
2008 0.68 0.51 0.43 0.36 0.75 0.60 0.51 0.44
2009 0.67 0.50 – – 0.76 0.58 – –
Source: IEB, own calculations
Table 5 Job Survival Probabilities after 6, 12, 18 and 24 Months of Duration, by Skill Level
West Germany
Unskilled Skilled Highly Skilled
Year 6 Mths 12 Mths 18 Mths 24 Mths 6 Mths 12 Mths 18 Mths 24 Mths 6 Mths 12 Mths 18 Mths 24 Mths
1998 0.65 0.47 0.40 0.33 0.72 0.56 0.48 0.41 0.84 0.71 0.62 0.53
1999 0.67 0.50 0.40 0.34 0.72 0.57 0.48 0.42 0.82 0.68 0.57 0.50
2000 0.63 0.45 0.36 0.30 0.71 0.56 0.46 0.40 0.81 0.67 0.56 0.48
2001 0.63 0.45 0.37 0.30 0.72 0.56 0.48 0.41 0.82 0.67 0.58 0.50
2002 0.63 0.43 0.36 0.30 0.71 0.55 0.48 0.41 0.80 0.66 0.58 0.51
2003 0.63 0.48 0.37 0.32 0.72 0.57 0.48 0.42 0.81 0.69 0.59 0.52
2004 0.63 0.46 0.38 0.33 0.72 0.57 0.48 0.42 0.80 0.68 0.59 0.52
2005 0.62 0.44 0.38 0.32 0.72 0.57 0.50 0.43 0.81 0.67 0.59 0.51
2006 0.63 0.47 0.38 0.33 0.71 0.56 0.48 0.41 0.81 0.68 0.59 0.51
2007 0.61 0.47 0.37 0.32 0.71 0.57 0.48 0.42 0.81 0.69 0.59 0.52
2008 0.59 0.43 0.35 0.30 0.71 0.56 0.48 0.41 0.82 0.70 0.61 0.53
2009 0.64 0.46 – – 0.71 0.56 – – 0.82 0.67 – –
Source: IEB, own calculations
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Table 6 Percentiles of the Wage Distribution and Changes, 1998 and 2010, by Gender
West Germany
Percentiles 1998 2010
25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile 25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile
Men 4.09 4.36 4.66 3.84 4.19 4.55
Women 3.78 4.13 4.45 3.66 4.05 4.44
Differences (log
points)
1998 2010 2010–1998 2010–1998
50th–25th per-
centile
75th–50th per-
centile
50th–25th per-
centile
75th–50th per-
centile
50th–25th per-
centile
75th–50th per-
centile
Men 0.27 0.30 0.35 0.36 0.08 0.06
Women 0.35 0.32 0.39 0.39 0.04 0.06
East Germany
Percentiles 1998 2010
25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile 25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile
Men 3.78 4.00 4.29 3.64 3.90 4.20
Women 3.61 3.86 4.28 3.48 3.81 4.25
Differences (log
points)
1998 2010 2010–1998 2010–1998
50th–25th per-
centile
75th–50th per-
centile
50th–25th per-
centile
75th–50th per-
centile
50th–25th per-
centile
75th–50th per-
centile
Men 0.21 0.29 0.27 0.30 0.05 0.01
Women 0.25 0.42 0.33 0.44 0.08 0.02
Source: IEB, own calculations
Table 7 Percentiles of the Wage Distribution and Changes, 1998 and 2010, by Skill Level
West Germany
Percentiles 1998 2010
25th per-
centile
50th per-
centile
75th per-
centile
25th percentile 50th per-
centile
75th per-
centile
Unskilled 3.69 3.98 4.26 3.51 3.75 4.08
Skilled 3.98 4.26 4.50 3.76 4.10 4.40
Highly Skilled 4.49 4.79 1 4.23 4.63 4.99
Differences (log points) 1998 2010 2010–1998 2010–1998
50th–25th per-
centile
75th–50th per-
centile
50th–25th per-
centile
75th–50th per-
centile
50th–25th
percentile
75th–50th per-
centile
Unskilled 0.29 0.28 0.24 0.33 –0.06 0.05
Skilled 0.28 0.24 0.34 0.29 0.06 0.05
Highly Skilled 0.30 1 0.40 0.36 0.10 a
aNo entry because of high proportion of censored wages. The proportion of highly skilled workers in new jobs with earnings above the social
security threshold is 29 % in 1998 and 17 % in 2010
Source: IEB, own calculations
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Table 8 Descriptive Statistics for Job Duration Models by Gender
Men Women
All peri-
ods
1998/02 2003/05 2006/08 All peri-
ods
1998/02 2003/05 2006/08
Time constant variables Relative Frequencies/Means
Quarter of entry
1st quarter 0.336 0.349 0.348 0.295 0.338 0.346 0.352 0.306
2nd quarter 0.245 0.243 0.237 0.258 0.228 0.232 0.219 0.227
3rd quarter 0.237 0.232 0.234 0.253 0.240 0.233 0.237 0.260
4th quarter 0.182 0.177 0.181 0.194 0.194 0.189 0.192 0.206
Local labour demanda
Unemployment rate 9.116 8.871 10.067 8.797 9.116 8.880 10.075 8.780
(3.27) (3.06) (3.32) (3.52) (3.23) (3.03) (3.28) (3.47)
Gdp growth 2.512 2.471 1.574 3.455 2.437 2.388 1.519 3.362
(3.39) (3.46) (3.05) (3.27) (3.32) (3.36) (2.99) (3.26)
Federal state
Schleswig Holstein, Hamburg 0.078 0.076 0.078 0.080 0.082 0.082 0.080 0.085
Lower Saxony, Bremen 0.120 0.119 0.119 0.123 0.124 0.122 0.125 0.125
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.277 0.277 0.283 0.271 0.267 0.267 0.271 0.264
Hesse 0.103 0.104 0.103 0.101 0.102 0.101 0.104 0.100
Rhineland Palatinate, Saarland 0.070 0.069 0.071 0.069 0.070 0.071 0.068 0.067
Baden-Württemberg 0.162 0.164 0.159 0.161 0.163 0.165 0.159 0.163
Bavaria 0.190 0.190 0.186 0.193 0.193 0.192 0.194 0.196
Firm size
1–19 0.305 0.310 0.312 0.288 0.326 0.338 0.323 0.302
20–49 0.157 0.156 0.157 0.158 0.144 0.143 0.147 0.145
50–249 0.276 0.263 0.277 0.301 0.274 0.265 0.275 0.293
250–999 0.155 0.160 0.145 0.153 0.162 0.161 0.159 0.167
1000 and more 0.107 0.110 0.108 0.099 0.094 0.093 0.096 0.093
Industry
Agriculture, mining 0.027 0.024 0.027 0.032 0.010 0.008 0.010 0.014
Energy, traffic and information 0.088 0.090 0.089 0.085 0.039 0.040 0.037 0.038
Manufacturing 0.273 0.291 0.257 0.250 0.147 0.161 0.137 0.125
Construction 0.090 0.096 0.093 0.076 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.012
Trade and retail 0.118 0.121 0.117 0.113 0.172 0.179 0.169 0.159
Business services 0.161 0.153 0.164 0.177 0.179 0.175 0.177 0.187
Personal and domestic services 0.050 0.050 0.049 0.050 0.083 0.084 0.084 0.081
Social and public services 0.131 0.133 0.142 0.117 0.320 0.312 0.334 0.325
Temporary work agency 0.061 0.043 0.061 0.101 0.037 0.026 0.037 0.060
Foreigner 0.144 0.134 0.142 0.167 0.101 0.091 0.104 0.120
Age
Age 25–29 0.220 0.221 0.197 0.240 0.216 0.214 0.204 0.230
Age 30–34 0.206 0.234 0.188 0.160 0.201 0.224 0.186 0.163
Age 35–39 0.191 0.196 0.198 0.176 0.196 0.198 0.207 0.183
Age 40–44 0.158 0.143 0.172 0.176 0.169 0.160 0.177 0.184
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Table 8 Descriptive Statistics for Job Duration Models by Gender (Continued)
Men Women
All peri-
ods
1998/02 2003/05 2006/08 All peri-
ods
1998/02 2003/05 2006/08
Time constant variables Relative Frequencies/Means
Age 45–49 0.125 0.114 0.135 0.141 0.128 0.121 0.130 0.140
Age 50–54 0.099 0.091 0.110 0.107 0.090 0.083 0.096 0.101
Skill level
Missing information on educational
level
0.030 0.027 0.029 0.039 0.025 0.023 0.024 0.028
No vocational training with at most
an intermediate degree
0.083 0.085 0.080 0.080 0.097 0.106 0.093 0.079
Vocational training with at most an
intermediate degree
0.579 0.596 0.578 0.541 0.574 0.597 0.565 0.529
High school/equivalent; with or
without vocational training
0.116 0.107 0.121 0.134 0.147 0.133 0.153 0.170
University/Technical/Professional
College degree
0.192 0.185 0.193 0.206 0.158 0.140 0.164 0.194
Preceding state
First spell 0.161 0.186 0.145 0.122 0.139 0.167 0.120 0.095
Job-to-job 0.351 0.342 0.350 0.373 0.340 0.323 0.352 0.368
Unemployed 0.245 0.238 0.262 0.244 0.216 0.216 0.223 0.209
Job followed by gap 0.126 0.113 0.134 0.148 0.184 0.159 0.205 0.220
Unemployment followed by gap 0.116 0.121 0.108 0.113 0.121 0.136 0.101 0.108
Part-time. (min. l8 h/week) 0.048 0.043 0.051 0.059 0.330 0.326 0.333 0.337
Number of observations 180,546 97,011 39,793 43,742 142,335 76,609 30,945 34,781
Duration of splitted spells
0–31 days 0.151 0.150 0.150 0.153 0.149 0.149 0.148 0.149
32–61 days 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.146 0.143 0.143 0.142 0.143
62–91 days 0.138 0.138 0.138 0.139 0.137 0.137 0.137 0.137
92–122 days 0.132 0.132 0.132 0.133 0.132 0.133 0.132 0.133
123–183 days 0.127 0.127 0.127 0.127 0.127 0.127 0.127 0.127
184–365 days 0.118 0.119 0.118 0.117 0.119 0.120 0.119 0.119
366–548 days 0.100 0.100 0.101 0.099 0.102 0.101 0.103 0.102
549–730 days 0.089 0.090 0.091 0.086 0.090 0.090 0.092 0.089
Number of subspells 1,197,088 646,105 265,721 285,262 956,467 513,922 209,477 233,068
aStandard deviation in parentheses
Source: IEB, Federal Statistical Office, own calculations
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Table 9 Descriptive Statistics for Wage Models by Gender
Men Women
All peri-
ods
1998/02 2003/05 2006/08 All
periods
1998/02 2003/05 2006/08
Relative Frequencies/Means
Skill level
Missing information on educational
level
0.030 0.026 0.028 0.041 0.027 0.023 0.026 0.035
No vocational training with at most
an intermediate degree
0.082 0.085 0.079 0.078 0.093 0.106 0.087 0.074
Vocational training with at most an
intermediate degree
0.585 0.605 0.591 0.546 0.550 0.582 0.549 0.496
High school/equivalent; with or
without vocational training
0.113 0.103 0.114 0.131 0.159 0.144 0.163 0.182
University/Technical/Professional
College degree
0.189 0.181 0.188 0.204 0.171 0.146 0.173 0.213
Potential experiencea 19.614 19.142 20.299 19.969 19.010 18.892 19.327 18.995
(8.62) (8.40) (8.60) (8.98) (8.81) (8.54) (8.80) (9.26)
Preceding state
First spell 0.160 0.185 0.146 0.127 0.144 0.171 0.127 0.108
Job-to-job 0.359 0.347 0.359 0.382 0.350 0.335 0.353 0.373
Unemployed 0.243 0.239 0.263 0.236 0.221 0.222 0.230 0.214
Job followed by gap 0.122 0.109 0.125 0.141 0.171 0.143 0.192 0.204
Unemployment followed by gap 0.116 0.120 0.107 0.114 0.115 0.129 0.099 0.101
Local labour demanda
Unemployment rate 9.027 8.848 10.034 8.628 9.018 8.812 10.042 8.670
(3.24) (3.05) (3.32) (3.37) (3.21) (3.01) (3.26) (3.37)
Gdp growth 2.092 2.490 1.580 1.746 2.022 2.422 1.497 1.693
(3.71) (3.47) (3.06) (4.40) (3.61) (3.36) (2.94) (4.31)
Federal state
Schleswig Holstein, Hamburg 0.077 0.075 0.077 0.079 0.083 0.081 0.083 0.085
Lower Saxony, Bremen 0.120 0.118 0.120 0.123 0.115 0.113 0.119 0.115
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.278 0.279 0.281 0.274 0.273 0.270 0.278 0.274
Hesse 0.102 0.102 0.104 0.101 0.100 0.101 0.101 0.099
Rhineland Palatinate, Saarland 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.068 0.070 0.066 0.067
Baden-Württemberg 0.163 0.165 0.160 0.163 0.165 0.168 0.160 0.164
Bavaria 0.191 0.192 0.189 0.192 0.196 0.197 0.194 0.196
Firm size
1–19 0.306 0.309 0.318 0.293 0.350 0.356 0.354 0.335
20–49 0.158 0.156 0.160 0.161 0.148 0.147 0.148 0.151
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Table 9 Descriptive Statistics for Wage Models by Gender (Continued)
Men Women
All peri-
ods
1998/02 2003/05 2006/08 All
periods
1998/02 2003/05 2006/08
Relative Frequencies/Means
50–249 0.277 0.266 0.274 0.297 0.265 0.259 0.267 0.274
250–999 0.154 0.160 0.142 0.152 0.150 0.150 0.145 0.153
1000 and more 0.105 0.109 0.106 0.097 0.088 0.089 0.086 0.087
Industry
Agriculture, mining 0.028 0.025 0.028 0.032 0.014 0.010 0.014 0.020
Energy, traffic and information 0.088 0.090 0.091 0.084 0.041 0.042 0.041 0.040
Manufacturing 0.282 0.298 0.272 0.260 0.178 0.198 0.169 0.148
Construction 0.092 0.099 0.094 0.080 0.016 0.018 0.017 0.014
Trade and retail 0.120 0.122 0.120 0.116 0.152 0.158 0.153 0.141
Business services 0.160 0.151 0.160 0.176 0.187 0.182 0.185 0.198
Personal and domestic services 0.047 0.047 0.045 0.047 0.096 0.098 0.095 0.092
Social and public services 0.120 0.123 0.129 0.107 0.267 0.259 0.274 0.276
Temporary work agency 0.064 0.046 0.061 0.098 0.049 0.035 0.051 0.071
Foreigner 0.143 0.133 0.140 0.165 0.109 0.098 0.109 0.129
Censored wage 0.097 0.108 0.084 0.087 0.029 0.031 0.023 0.028
Number of observations 178,065 90,818 36,349 50,898 99,012 50,032 19,935 29,045
aStandard deviation in parentheses
Source: IEB, Federal Statistical office, own calculations
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